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539 
A Republic, If You Can Keep It 
Address by the Honorable Edwin A. Meese III* 
 
Well, thank you very much, John, and thank you, ladies and 
gentlemen, for your warm welcome. 
You know, John mentioned about that speech that I gave.  
You may not realize this, but I am greatly indebted to Justice 
Brennan.  He may not be the Justice with whom I at that time 
most agreed, but he did a very beneficial thing.  He replied to my 
speech.  If it had not been for his reply, that speech probably 
would have been gone where most ABA speeches go—forgotten.  
But instead, he gave a speech in which he responded to my re-
marks about originalism, and so the fight was on.  And so it has 
been a continuing topic ever since, and they tell me even in law 
schools that occasionally they discuss this in constitutional law 
classes. 
As a matter of fact, shortly after I had raised this point about 
the Constitution being important as well as constitutional law, 
and in that speech I mentioned that in the leading constitutional 
casebook, the constitutional law casebook, the Constitution didn’t 
make it until Appendix H.  And pretty soon, about two weeks 
later, I got a letter from a professor whose name will go 
unmentioned.  And he said, “You talked about the leading case-
book.  It must be mine.  And I want you to know that in the next 
edition, the Constitution will be Appendix A.”  So I thought we 
made a little progress there. 
John [Eastman], I want to certainly thank you for your very 
kind introduction, but also thank you for all you do.  John, as you 
all know, besides all he does as a professor, now as an adminis-
trator, also, with his constitutional work.  I always know that 
John is working because I will wake up in the morning and go to 
my fax machine and get a brief that he and I were working on.  
Actually, you know, it’s kind of a 99%/1% type of brief.  And John 
will have it there, and the time noted is 2:00 a.m., or 3:00 a.m.  I 
                                                          
 * United States Attorney General, 1985–1988; Ronald Reagan Distinguished Fellow 
in Public Policy and Chairman of the Center for Legal and Judicial Studies at The Heri-
tage Foundation. 
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think he doesn’t sleep at all.  But he certainly is a great adjunct 
to your school here. 
And it’s great to see my good friend Daniele Struppa, who 
was such an outstanding administrator.  And definitely, Chap-
man’s gain was George Mason’s loss.  But I know he’s very happy 
here in this entrepreneurial university that you have.  And so it’s 
great to see him. 
And also Grover Trask, whom I’ve had the pleasure of work-
ing with over the years, most recently when he was Chairman of 
the American Prosecutors Research Institute, and was really, in 
my view, the role model of what a responsible professional prose-
cutor should be.  And so it’s a pleasure to be with them and oth-
ers that I know here. 
I must confess—this is a day of confessions, no pun intended, 
but I must confess that I too like Dirty Harry.  And my kids know 
that.  And so for my birthday last year, I was presented with this 
collection of Dirty Harry movies.  There’s a box that has five 
Dirty Harry movies.  And they presented them to me.  And so on 
several occasions, I must confess that I have been watching it 
with my 14-year-old grandson. 
Now after seeing that, and what I’ve heard today, I think 
that every one of those boxes ought to have a warning that says 
something like this: “If shown to children, please advise that 
Dirty Harry’s conduct is not judicially acceptable behavior.” 
I want to congratulate Chapman Law Review on this confer-
ence.  Besides the fact that it is being tremendously well-
organized and well-run, just the selection of the topic I think is 
very appropriate.  We’ve had four decades which give us now I 
think a little perspective on what was at the time a novel policy 
pronouncement by the Supreme Court in 1966.  And it enables us 
to see some of the results, and also to talk about where we are as 
a nation, where we are in the criminal justice system today, and 
to some degree because of that decision. 
It’s also worthwhile, I think, to examine the Miranda rule in 
the light of what we might call modern legal issues, such as is be-
ing done here.  Corporate criminality, which will be discussed 
later on today.  The new style of warfare that emerges, as we 
heard this morning.  Concepts of military action and law en-
forcement, and many other things that are being discussed.  The 
media, which I found all the panels this morning extremely in-
teresting, and look forward to this afternoon. 
My topic, as you saw, is “A Republic, if You Can Keep It.”  As 
you probably know, that’s a play on the comment of Benjamin 
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Franklin, when the Constitutional Convention had adjourned in 
1787, and a lady stopped him on the street and said, “Mr. Frank-
lin, what kind of government have you given us?”  And he said, 
“A republic, if you can keep it.” 
And the reason I chose that is that I think the founders’ con-
cept of ordered liberty, which resulted in our Constitution, served 
the interests of the people then and continue to serve in terms of 
having an effective government, and at the same time having 
freedom and liberty for the people. 
And I think it is particularly appropriate to discuss the 
Miranda decision and its progeny in the light of what the foun-
ders intended in the Constitution, and where we are today, be-
cause I would suggest to you that the Miranda decision is the 
epitome of what was then considered the new jurisprudence of 
the Warren Court, which from the 1950’s, the late 1950’s through 
the 1970’s, and then continuing under Chief Justice Berger, im-
pressed a series of novel concepts onto constitutional law. 
I’m going to discuss the Miranda decision in regard to two 
questions that we might ask.  One is, was it legitimate?  And is 
the Miranda doctrine today legitimate.  And secondly, is it wise? 
Going back to 1787, the founders were very much concerned 
with this whole idea of liberty and power.  Liberty on the part of 
the people, and power on the part of government.  And they felt 
that liberty had to be contained and had to be harnessed, if you 
will, because of the tremendous power that inherently govern-
ment has. 
And so to do that, they divided power both horizontally and 
vertically.  Vertically in the sense of allocating certain powers, 
certain limited powers, to the federal government, to the central 
government, and then the rest of governmental power to the 
states, which were diffuse, and would become more diffuse as 
more states joined the Union.  And they devolved it and diffused 
it horizontally by having three separate powers, three separate 
locus of powers, the legislative, the executive, and the judicial au-
thority. 
And it was this scheme that they thought up, that they felt 
was important in order to contain the coercive power of govern-
ment in a way that it would not be used to oppress the people. 
Well, I would suggest to you that in some ways, Miranda as 
a decision then and as it has continued, is at odds with both of 
those concepts.  It has—did, in fact, at the time, with its compan-
ion decision, the Mapp against Ohio decision, both of which in-
voked the exclusionary rule—nationalized criminal procedure.  
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Up until that time it had been for the federal government to 
handle criminal procedure on national matters, matters before 
the federal courts, but leaving it to the states pretty much to de-
velop their own jurisprudence, their own criminal procedures 
where most crime occurred, where most crimes were prosecuted; 
in state courts, where murders, robberies, rapes, burglaries, and 
the things that people thought of in general as crimes, were being 
investigated and prosecuted. 
Well, in 1966, state prosecutions at that time were quite dif-
ferent from federal prosecutions.  As I mentioned, they had these 
more serious crimes, the more violent crimes.  In those days, fed-
eral prosecutions were primarily limited to white collar and ad-
ministrative offenses, things like violations of the tax law.  
Probably the most violent type of crime you got had to do with 
those things, relating to organized crime and interstate crime.  
That sort of thing. 
But by and large, there was pretty much of a dichotomy.  
And so even the rules that then pertained to the FBI, which were 
rules of procedure more than constitutional limitations, concern-
ing the warnings they would give when they made arrests and so 
on, were much easier to apply because they dealt with essentially 
white collar criminals, and a different type of criminal investiga-
tion than what normally took place at the state and local level. 
And so the Miranda decision essentially violated the tradi-
tional concept of leaving state procedures to the state legisla-
tures, and to some extent, to the state courts.  But it also violated 
the separation of powers.  Nino Scalia, in the Dickerson decision 
some years later, of course, put it this way.  He said that the 
court flagrantly offends fundamental principles of separation of 
powers, and arrogates to itself prerogatives reserved to the rep-
resentatives of the people.  Because what they did was essen-
tially take away from the people’s representatives—by invoking 
the Constitution—the ability to determine what the procedures 
should be in regard to arrests and custodial interrogation. 
In effect, the Court provided a single national standard, 
overruling the states, even though the states were supposed to 
be, as another justice in a different case said, “laboratories of 
democracy,” so that they could experiment.  And indeed, in 1966, 
the different states were dealing with this problem in different 
ways.  California had the Dorado rule, which in effect was very 
similar in many ways to the Mapp rule.  Michigan had a little 
different rule.  Other states were trying out other things. 
But of course, as the Miranda decision came down, it essen-
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tially eclipsed what the state was doing, and made a single stan-
dard for the entire nation.  Likewise, it violated the concept of 
separation of powers.  As the dissent pointed out, the original 
Miranda decision was based on policy grounds rather than con-
stitutional grounds.  As a matter of fact, as again stated in the 
dissent, examined as an expression of public policy, the Court’s 
new regime proves so dubious that there can be no due compen-
sation for its weakness in constitutional law. 
And then the author of the dissent went on to say, legal his-
tory has been stretched before to satisfy deep needs of society.  In 
this instance, however, the Court has not and cannot make the 
powerful showing that its new rules are plainly desirable in the 
context of our society, something which is surely demanded be-
fore those rules are engrafted onto the Constitution and imposed 
on every state and county in the land. 
Well, applying the exclusionary rule to the statements of 
suspects may or may not be a good idea.  And indeed, over the 
years, we’ve had people on both sides of the criminal process 
opine on this.  We’ve had some defense attorneys who have been 
willing to say that they felt that the exclusionary rule was not a 
good idea, based upon their experience.  We’ve also had prosecu-
tors in some cases and even some police executives say that the 
exclusionary rule helped professionalize the police. 
So there have been arguments on both sides, as indeed we’ve 
heard already in the panels today.  But I would suggest to you 
that this is a policy decision that should be left to Congress and 
the state legislatures.  And in effect, the Court compounded what 
was an arrogation of power and the misuse of their power in the 
Miranda decision when, in the Dickerson decision, they deliber-
ately defied the policy decision by Congress on how to deal with 
interrogations in cases before the federal courts. 
As most of you know, and it was referred to in a couple of the 
talks this morning, Congress, within two years or so after the 
Miranda decision, felt there was a better way, and that was 
when they passed a statute embodied in 18 U.S. Code section 
33501, which provided that federal judges should determine, out-
side the presence of the jury, whether a particular confession or 
statement was voluntary or not, based upon several criteria that 
they set forth in the decision, and looking at a totality of the cir-
cumstances. 
Well, in considering that statute in Dickerson, the Court con-
sidered that congressional action was an affront to their exercise 
of judicial power, and so we got, as a result, the Dickerson deci-
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sion. 
Dickerson was a striking example, in my opinion, of the 
Court pulling itself up by its own bootstraps to make Miranda, 
the Miranda rules, a constitutionally required doctrine.  The 
Court in the original decision had been somewhat tentative, be-
cause they knew they were on thin ice, I think, constitutionally.  
And in numerous subsequent cases, the Court took the position 
that the Miranda rules were not constitutionally required. 
They were somewhat ambivalent, as I say, and very hesitant, 
in the Miranda case itself, but in other cases, they talked about 
the procedural safeguards adopted in Miranda, and they said 
that they were not themselves rights protected by the Constitu-
tion, but were instead measures to ensure that the right against 
compulsory self-incrimination was protected.  They talked about 
the standards as being prophylactic rather than constitutionally 
required, and so on. 
And as a result, they went on to say—they encouraged it, ac-
tually—that state legislatures and the Congress should find al-
ternative ways to deal with the problem of preventing involun-
tary confessions, which was ultimately a question—from common 
law days on, as we heard this morning in the history of this pro-
vision—of involuntary confessions or confessions that were obvi-
ously bad and should not be countenanced. 
And they said things like this.  It is impossible for us, the 
Court said, to foresee the potential alternatives for protecting the 
privilege which might be devised by Congress or the states in the 
exercise of their creative rule-making capacities.  Therefore, we 
cannot say that the Constitution necessarily requires adherence 
to any particular solution for the inherent compulsions of the in-
terrogation process as it is presently conducted. 
And yet in Dickerson, suddenly the Court abruptly changes 
this approach and says that the Miranda rules are now constitu-
tionally required.  Now, the specious reasoning that they used 
then was a sort of constitutional sleight of hand.  Indeed, as was 
discussed this morning by a couple of the speakers, they first 
said, well, it must be constitutional because it applies to the 
states.  And if it was not constitutional, we couldn’t have author-
ity over the states to apply it. 
Now this is kind of being—when I say pulling yourselves up 
by your own bootstraps, this was, I would suggest, arrogance and 
speciousness carried to the nth degree.  But then they went on to 
say, as it was—as many people have noted—that stare decisis en-
trenched the decision.  They even admitted this, the Chief Justice 
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writing in Dickerson, saying, “We might not have made the same 
decision today if we had this before us as a first instance, but it 
was enacted several decades ago, and so we have, on the basis of 
stare decisis, we won’t correct our earlier mistake.”  He didn’t say 
it quite that boldly, but that was the gravamen of what he had to 
say. 
And so that was the second.  And then the third reason, as 
has been discussed in some detail today, they said: Miranda has 
become embedded in routine police practice to the point where 
the warnings have become part of our national culture.  And you 
heard about Jack Webb, who made the same observation when I 
read that passage, as well as the others, where it is—I hadn’t re-
alized, though, until I heard the excellent presentation this 
morning, that it’s been embedded and now un-embedded in the 
national culture. 
But be that as it may, those were the reasons they gave for 
making a total change, a major change, in what the constitu-
tional effect of the decision was. 
And so as a result of that, we have the situation which we 
have today.  And so I think it’s important to say that, in terms of 
the legitimacy of the Miranda decision originally, that the deci-
sion initially in Miranda raised serious questions as to its consti-
tutional legitimacy.  And the case of Dickerson raises serious 
questions as to the ability of a court, essentially exercising its 
own power.  As was said in dissent in Dickerson: To justify to-
day’s agreed upon result, the Court must adopt a significant new, 
if not entirely comprehensible, principle of constitutional law.  As 
the Court chooses to describe that principle, statutes of Congress 
can be disregarded.  Such as Section 3501, which was at issue in 
Dickerson. 
“Not only when what they prescribed violates the Constitu-
tion, but when what they prescribe contradicts a decision of this 
Court, that ‘announced a constitutional rule.’”  And then the dis-
sent goes on to say that the only thing that this can possibly 
mean in the context of this case is that this Court has the power 
merely to apply the Constitution and to expand it, imposing what 
it regards as useful prophylactic restrictions upon Congress and 
the states.  And then the conclusion that the author comes to 
says: That is an immense and frightening anti-democratic power, 
and it does not exist. 
Well, let’s turn to the second question that I raised, and that 
is, is it wise?  Justice Scalia raised that question when he wrote 
in the dissent in Dickerson.  He said, what is most remarkable 
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about the Miranda decision and what made it unacceptable as a 
matter of straightforward constitutional interpretation in the 
Marbury sense is in its palpable hostility toward the act of con-
fessions per se rather than toward what the Constitution abhors, 
which is compelled confession. 
We heard a great deal of discussion about the difference of 
that this morning.  I would suggest to you that the exclusionary 
rule itself is at the bottom of the major problem with both Mapp 
as well as Miranda.  It appears to me, at least, that it is improper 
for any court to exclude—it’s at odds with the purpose of a crimi-
nal trial, and that is that the trial should be a search for the 
truth.  And on that basis, then, to determine the culpability and 
the liability of an accused person. 
But the exclusionary rule deliberately obscures from the trial 
a portion of the truth, and valid, probative, relevant, and accu-
rate evidence is kept from the decider of fact for policy reasons 
that are unrelated to the purpose of judicial proceedings. 
Now, it’s important to state why a statement is important in 
a case.  It’s not the fact that a police officer arriving on the scene 
or apprehending a defendant necessarily expects or is intent just 
on getting a confession.  Sometimes that happens.  But what the 
police officer wants to do is to pin that defendant down to a par-
ticular story so that he can’t remain silent, and then, when he 
gets to the trial, make up a story—unfortunately often with the 
compliance of his attorney—that weaves its way around the evi-
dence the prosecution is able to put forward before the jury. 
Whereas if you pin him down at the time, at the scene, or 
when he’s arrested, to a particular story, then he’s not able to tell 
something else in court, which he has made up to try to exoner-
ate himself.  And that’s why the statement is so important in a 
police investigation, not merely a confession.  And this is some-
thing that is often left out when discussion is made about com-
pelled confessions and that sort of thing. 
I don’t think any of us is in favor of a coerced or a compelled 
confession.  But on the other hand, getting the defendant pinned 
down.  Of course, this thing was compounded—this whole prob-
lem was compounded by subsequent decision, including Griffin 
against California and others, which says that a prosecutor can’t 
even comment on the fact that this person, when questioned by 
the police, refused to explain why he was there or what he was 
doing, something that any innocent person would logically do.  
And so you have this Catch-22 that first of all, you have to give 
them the warning to discourage them from saying anything, and 
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then the fact that he acts in a way very different from an inno-
cent person can’t even be commented on at the time of trial. 
The original Miranda conclusion was based on a dubious fac-
tual basis.  As a matter of fact, if you read Miranda, you saw a 
regurgitation by Earl Warren of a bunch of cases and a bunch of 
articles that were long since overcome or eclipsed by actual police 
conduct in the 1960s.  They relied on the Wickersham Report 
from 1931.  They relied on an article in Southern California Law 
Review in 1930.  They relied on a Michigan Law Review article in 
1932.  They relied on a University of Chicago Law Review article 
in 1936. 
I happened to be a prosecutor in 1966.  And the things that 
they were relying on in order to justify this unusual change, ma-
jor change in criminal procedure, was totally at odds with the 
District Attorney’s Office and the police departments that I knew 
about, that I worked with every day, and I think with what most 
of the prosecutors worked with throughout the country. 
Now, the impact of Miranda on public safety also is a factor 
that ought to be considered.  The dissent in the original case was 
really prophetic.  The dissent said that there can be little doubt 
that the Court’s new code would markedly decrease the number 
of confessions.  And while that has perhaps not been as great as 
might have been anticipated, there’s no question that particu-
larly immediately following the decision and since that time, that 
there has been a decrease in confessions or at least in statements 
given by defendants because of the Miranda rules, which quite 
frankly are intended and do have the effect of discouraging a 
suspect from saying anything. 
And then the dissent said: How much harm this decision will 
inflict on law enforcement cannot fairly be predicted with accu-
racy, but we do know that some crimes cannot be solved without 
confessions, that ample expert testimony attests to their impor-
tance in crime control.  It went on to say that there was, in sum, 
a legitimate purpose, no perceptible unfairness, and certainly lit-
tle risk of injustice in the interrogation.  Yet the resulting confes-
sions and the responsible course of police practice that they rep-
resent are to be sacrificed to the Court’s own fine-spun confession 
of fairness, which I seriously doubt is shared by many thinking 
citizens in this country. 
One of the justices writing in dissent said: I have no desire to 
share in the responsibility for the impact on the present criminal 
process.  And he went on to say: There is, in my view, every rea-
son to believe that a good many criminal defendants who other-
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wise would have been convicted on what this court has previously 
thought to be the most satisfactory kind of evidence will now, 
under this new version of the Fifth Amendment, either not be 
tried at all, or will be acquitted if the State’s evidence minus the 
confession is put to the test of litigation. 
Well, this warning was indeed confirmed by the facts.  An 
econometric analysis of the precipitous drop in clearance rates—
that’s the rate at which police officers are able to clear through 
arrest and prosecution—have found that tens of thousands of 
crimes go unsolved each year as a result of the Miranda decision. 
Indeed, Paul Cassell, now a judge on the Federal Court, but 
at that time a professor, did a study of prosecutions and clear-
ance rates, primarily clearance rates, from 1950 to 1995.  And he 
found that in the four-year period immediately after the Miranda 
decision, there was a precipitous drop in clearance rates for vio-
lent crimes: in the period between 1950 and 1965 or 1966, any-
where from 60% to 65% of violent crimes were cleared by arrest, 
whereas immediately after—by 1969, four years later—that had 
dropped to something in the neighborhood of the 40% area, a 
drop of over 25% in crimes cleared by arrest. 
And finally, I’d like to ask the question in terms of the wis-
dom of Miranda.  Is it necessary to accomplish the purpose, 
which as we know is preventing involuntary or coerced state-
ments?  And I would suggest to you that things have changed a 
great deal, even from 1966, because federal statutes and related 
bodies of law provide now for civil, criminal, and administrative 
penalties against police officers who coerce suspects.  Almost all 
of this law has been created since Miranda, and certainly has 
made the legal incentives for non-coercive police questioning al-
most unrecognizably greater than it was when Miranda was de-
cided. 
And so as we look at Miranda 40 years later, the question is 
whether Miranda really makes sense in terms of the facts.  Offi-
cers who forcibly extract confessions are now subject to criminal 
sanctions under 18 U.S. Code, as we all know, sections 241 and 
242.  We have the Federal Tort Claims Act.  We have the Bivens 
cases, and so on. 
So that those who coerce confessions, these other disincen-
tives, these other penalties, are much more effective than the 
Miranda decision or the Miranda rules, or the exclusion of evi-
dence on the basis of the Miranda rules not being followed, be-
cause actually, as has been stated, the exclusion of evidence does 
not apply any direct sanction to the individual officer or the indi-
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vidual official whose illegal or alleged illegal conduct is at issue. 
And so there’s a real question as to whether indeed there is a 
need in the light of modern circumstances, and certainly that was 
true at the time of Dickerson, but apparently was unavailing to 
the court as they made that decision. 
Well, what does all this mean in view of the Dickerson hold-
ing and the place of Miranda in today’s state of criminal proce-
dure?  Regretfully, I don’t believe the Dickerson and Miranda 
cases will be overruled in the foreseeable future.  I think I can 
almost guarantee it in my professional lifetime.  By the way, 
John was kind enough to mention that I was 75.  I view that as 
middle-aged, John.  Halfway between 50 and 100. 
But nevertheless, I think it’s worthwhile considering 
Miranda, and going back and looking at it originally, looking at it 
in light of Dickerson, and looking at it where we are today.  I 
think a conference like ours today is valuable both to critique the 
original decision as well as to assess its validity and its useful-
ness in the ensuing decades right up to the present time. 
For one reason, first, perhaps an objective evaluation of the 
original decision done in the perspective of 40 years of experience 
will be a warning against judicial activism in the future. 
Secondly, an analysis of Miranda can perhaps prevent its 
expansion to areas for which it is not appropriate.  Such, in my 
opinion, as the battlefield in time of war.  That was discussed, of 
course, in much detail this morning. 
And third, a careful examination of Miranda can point to-
wards ways in which the doctrine should be applied and also the 
ways in which it should be limited to accomplish its purported 
goal, and that is to protect against coerced and involuntary con-
fessions, while at the same time limiting its negative effect on 
public safety. 
Then, as a result of conferences like this, as a result of give 
and take, as we have here, from people with very different points 
of view on Miranda, I think we will be carrying out what we 
should be doing as members of the legal profession and legal edu-
cation, and that is working to keep our nation safe and free.  
Thank you. 
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